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7.1  Introduction 
Equity in housing is a major component of household wealth in the United 
States. Demographic impacts on housing prices can have potentially large ef- 
fects on the welfare of households that anticipate using their equity when they 
are old to finance consumption and insure against risks of major medical costs. 
Mankiw and Weil(l989) and McFadden (1994a) have argued that population 
aging in the United States in the coming three decades is likely to induce sub- 
stantial declines in housing prices, resulting in capital losses for current home- 
owners. McFadden argues that the welfare impact of  these capital losses is 
small if  they are anticipated and savings rates  adjust to optimize life-cycle 
consumption. However, the impact near the end of life of some cohorts could 
be large if they have failed to adjust savings behavior to compensate for demo- 
graphically induced losses in housing wealth. This paper examines further the 
question of whether households anticipate demographic impacts on housing 
prices and adjust their savings behavior in response. 
Section 7.2 summarizes the evidence on the relationship  between  demo- 
graphics and behavior of the housing market. Section 7.3 contains an analysis 
of life-cycle savings behavior using data from the Panel Study of Income Dy- 
namics and examines the question of whether savings rates are correlated with 
capital gains rates. Zero correlation corresponds to complete behavioral offset, 
with each increase in savings due to capital gains offset by a reduction in savings 
from other channels. High correlation corresponds to a failure to anticipate price 
changes or to adjust savings behavior in response. Section 7.4 concludes. 
Hilary W. Hoynes is assistant professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley, 
and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Daniel L. McFadden 
is the Cox Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a research associ- 
ate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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7.2  Demographics and the Housing Market 
7.2.1  Background 
Over the period  1900-1990, McFadden (1994a) finds for the United States 
a correlation of 0.966 between real constant-quality housing stock and popula- 
tion.' This suggests that the force of demographics is a leading determinant of 
housing demand, even though adjustments in household formation and disso- 
lution, housing consumption in square meters per person, and dwelling quality 
in response to income and price may be important at the margin. 
New construction is a relatively small proportion of the housing stock: real 
gross investment has averaged 5.3 percent of the real housing stock over 1900- 
1990. Consequently, the short-run price  elasticity  of  supply of  dwellings is 
relatively low, even though new construction is fairly responsive to price. Then 
demographic trends that affect housing demand should induce substantial, and 
largely forecastable, movements in housing prices. The correlation of popula- 
tion and housing prices was 0.883 over 1900-1990. 
We shall review the standard theory of the housing market and identify the 
role of demographic factors in determining stocks and prices. For complete- 
ness, we begin by developing the standard consumer model of housing demand 
and deriving the conventional formula for the user cost of housing. A compara- 
tive statics analysis of this model identifies qualitatively the linkage between 















Cost of living index 
Dummy variable: one for owner, zero for renter 
Nominal rental rate per unit of constant-quality housing 
Nominal purchase price per unit of constant-quality housing 
Marginal income (and capital gains) tax rate 
Property tax rate 
Maintenance (or depreciation) rate 
Share of purchase mortgaged 
Mortgage interest rate (nominal) 
After-tax interest rate, r'  =  (1 -  rn)r 
Operating cost rate for owned housing, p = (Or + ~)(1  -  rn) + S 
Nominal financial assets of the consumer (debt if negative) 
Nominal wealth 
Nominal income 
1. The GNP Residential Investment Deflator is  assumed  to be  a valid  measure  of  nominal 
constant-quality housing price. Residential Investment, deflated by  this measure, is then accumu- 
lated at a depreciation rate of  2.687 percent  to obtain real constant-quality  housing stock. The 
depreciation rate is chosen so that the series is commensurate with the Department of Commerce 
series on Value of Net Stocks of Residential Structures. The Residential Investment Deflator, di- 
vided by  the total GNP Implicit Price Deflator, is taken as the measure of  the price of constant- 






Real consumption of goods other than housing 
Real consumption of constant-quality housing units 
Capital gains rate, P = <P, -  P,)/P, 
Consumer’s expected capital gains rate 
Consumer’s variance of capital gains rate 
Consider for simplicity a consumer who is endowed with initial (after-tax) 
wealth  W,, lives one period, and then leaves a bequest  W, in the following 
period. The consumer must decide on levels of consumption of housing units 
(h)  and goods other than housing (g), and on whether to rent (d = 0) or own 
(d = I). Assume the consumer’s utility function has the form 
(1)  Q = U(g,  h)  + E V(  W2I~J, 
where U is the utility of  current consumption,  V is the utility of bequests, and 
the expectation is taken with respect to future housing prices, which are un- 
known when consumption decisions must be taken. Although we shall not do 
so in this paper, it is possible to interpret V as a valuation function, which may 
depend on age, health, and mortality risk, and to allow U to depend on age and 
health. Then equation (1) will be the term entering Bellman’s equation for the 
consumer’s dynamic stochastic program. We make the following assumptions 
on U, r! and beliefs about future prices: 
1.  U  is  strictly  concave  and  nondecreasing,  with  V,U(O,  h) =  +-, 
V,,U(g, 0) = +-,  and V,U(g,  +-)  = 0. 
2.  Housing  and  nonhousing  consumption  are  normal  goods;  that  is, 
Vp(VsU/V,U) 5  0 and V,(VxU/V,Cr,  2 0. 
3.  V is  a constant  relative  risk aversion  utility  function; that  is, V(w) = 
-Ce-“”,  where C and K are positive parameters. 
4.  All variables except k are in the consumer’s initial information set 9,  and 
given this information the consumer believes that P has a normal distribution 
with mean a  and variance u’. 
The consumer’s budget constraint in the first period is 
(2) 0 = w,  +(I -  m)Y,  Initial after-tax wealth and after-tax 
income 
- n,‘s  Nonhousing expenditures 
-  (1 -  d)Rh  Housing expenditures if renter 
-  dh{(i -  e)Pl  Out-of-pocket housing expenditures 
+ P,  [(Or + T)(I -  m)  + 61)  if owner 
-A,  Financial assets purchased 
Line four of equation (2),  out-of-pocket housing expenditures, is composed of 
the down payment  (1 -  O)P,h,  mortgage interest r0P,h,  property taxes TP,~, 
maintenance or depreciation W,h,  and an offset m(rO + T)P,h  arising from the 
deductability of mortgage interest and property taxes from income subject to 156  Hilary W.  Hoynes and Daniel L. McFadden 
income taxes. Using the definition of p,,  line four can be written compactly as 
-dhPl(l -  0 + k).  The second period budget constraint is 
(3) 0 = [l  + (1 -  m)r]A,  Financial assets with after-tax 
interest 
Housing equity net of capital 
gains tax 
+ dh[P, -  OP, -  m(P, -  PI)] 
- w,  Bequest 
For simplicity, we assume that financial assets are held as savings accounts 
(resp. consumer loans) that carry the mortgage interest rate r, and that interest 
income (resp. expense) is taxed (resp. deducted) at the marginal rate m. Then 
the first line of equation (3) gives financial assets in the second period after 
taxes. The second line of equation (3) gives the cash received from sale of a 
house in period 2, less repayment of mortgage principal (P,  -  0P,)h  and taxes 
on nominal capital gains m(P, -  P,)h, which are assumed to be taxed at the 
same rate as ordinary income. Using the definitions of r'  and b, this constraint 
can be written compactly as 
0 = (1 + r')A, + dhP,[l -  0 + (1 -  m)p] - W,. 
Combining equations (2) and (3) to eliminate A,  gives an intertemporal bud- 
get constraint, 
(4)  W2  =dhPl[l -  0 + (1 -  m)p] + [l + rr]  [ W,  + (1 -  m)Y, 
-T,g -  (1 -  d)Rh -  dhP,  (1 -  0 + k)} 
= (1 + r')  [W,  + (1 -  m)Y, -  n,g -  (1 -  d)Rh] 
-  dhP, [(l + r')~  + rt (1 -  0) -  (1 -  m)PI. 
Substituting equation (4)  into equation (1)  and taking the expectation gives the 
objective function 
(5)  Ou  = U(g,  h) - C . exp  w -  (1 + r')-rrlg 
-  (1 -  d)(l + r')Rh -  dhP,c -  Pih2d 
where 
w  = (1 + r')[W,  + (1 -  m)Y,], 
q = Ka2(1 -  m),/.rr,, 
c = (1 + rr)p  + rt  (1 -  0) -  (1 -  m)a = (1 -  m)(r  + 7) 
+ s -  (I -  m)a. 
Then w is total initial wealth, q is a risk penalty associated with the uncertainty 
about future house prices, and c is the expected user cost of  housing  per dollar 
purchased. The last form of  c is obtained using the approximation r'k = 0. 
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where 
-  (1 -  d)(l + r')Rh -  dhP,c -  P:hzd 9 
2 
A consumer whose utility U does not depend on tenure d will choose to own 
if P,c' <  R, where c'  = c + P,hq/2, and rent otherwise. If all consumers are 
identical, then equilibrium in  a market in which both purchased and rental 
housing appear requires that prices and rents adjust so that R = P,c'. On the 
other hand, if there is a distribution of beliefs, or even a distribution of wealth 
and income that induces a distribution of c',  then the split between owning and 
renting will be determined by the proportion of consumers with c'  satisfying 
P,c' <  R, with R and PI  adjusting to clear the purchase and rental markets. Of 
course, if there is a distribution of tastes for tenure entering U,  or of degrees 
of  risk aversion K, this will split the population between owners and renters 
even if all consumers have common beliefs. 
The marginal utility of additional housing is positive. Then when faced with 
negative c,  corresponding to a high rate of positive capital gains, the consumer 
will choose d = 1 and a high level of h, financing the purchase by borrowing 
financial assets at the after-tax rate (1 -  m)r.  Risk aversion will, however, keep 
h 5  -2c/P,q. The market will respond to this increase in the demand for pur- 
chases by increasing PI.  This arbitrage opportunity implies that very large an- 
ticipated capital gains over very short periods will be squeezed out by the mar- 
ket. Similarly, large anticipated capital losses should induce a shift to rental 
housing, which lowers PI  and squeezes out some of the capital losses. In prac- 
tice, consumers are additionally constrained with respect to the proportion of 
a housing purchase they can mortgage and with respect to financing down 
payments with borrowed money, and there are substantial transactions costs 
associated with moves between rental and owner housing or in changing hous- 
ing consumption levels in owner-occupied housing. These will further limit 
the scope for arbitrage by consumers and leave the possibility of modest antici- 
pated capital gains and losses that are not arbitraged away. From the last form 
of the definition of c,  the user cost of housing does not depend on equity versus 
debt financing (e),  a consumer equivalent of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. 
A comparative statics analysis of the impact of income and prices on con- 
sumer decisions can be carried out given the assumptions below equation (l), 
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5. The elasticities of g and h with respect to w are less than one. 
6. The elasticity of h with respect to R (for renters) or PI  (for owners) is 
7.  The elasticity of substitution between g and h is at most one. 
8.  The degree of relative risk aversion is less than two. 
The directions of change expected under assumptions 1-8  are summarized 
in table 7.1. The impact of PI  in this table does not take into account indirect 
effects arising because PI  affects consumer beliefs  about  capital gains. The 
first row of the table is constructed under the assumption that across consumers 
there is a continuous distribution of beliefs about capital gains rates and that 
this distribution divides the population into owners and renters. The expected 
capital gains rate a  is reinterpreted as characterizing the location of this distri- 
bution. Details of the construction of the table are given in the appendix. 
Define the ex ante expected savings rate of the consumer to be se  = (W2  - 
W,)/Y,,  and the expost realized savings rate to be s = (W, -  WJY, =  se + (1 
-  m)dhP,(i -  a)/Yl.  From table 7.1, the ex ante savings rate should fall when 
P, rises and rise when a  rises, other things being equal. This effect can be 
reversed if consumers believe that a  is higher when P, is higher. Define + = 
(1 -  rn)dhP,/Y,,  and let a'  = Ep,,h denote the statistical expectation of k, 
given initial information. Then s = se + +(i  -  a),  implying that Epl,as  = se  + 
+(ar  -  a)  and s -  EFl,$s  = +(h -  ar).  In the population, the ex post savings 
rate satisfies 
less than one in magnitude. 
(8)  COV(S,  PI)  =E,*(s' + +(ar  -  &)](PI  -  E,P,) 
=E,se(P, -  ESP,)  + E,+(a' -  a)(P, -  ESP,) 
(9)  COV(S,  P) = E,{s'  + +(P -  ar)  + +(a' -  a)} 
(S  -  ar  + a' -  E,a') 
= E,se(ar -  E4ar)  + E,+.Var(l?4) 
+ ES+(ar  -  a)(a' -  E4ar). 
If consumer expectations a  do not depend on PI  and rational expectations a' 
are uncorrelated with PI,  then the first term in equation (8) should be negative 
from table 7.1 and the second term should be zero, so that Cov(s, PI)  < 0. If 
consumer expectations a  are positively correlated with P,, then the first term 
in equation (8) can be positive; the second term will reinforce this if rational 
expectations are more positively correlated with PI  than beliefs and will offset 
this otherwise. The first term in equation (9) is nonnegative from table 7.1, 
provided consumer expectations are nonnegatively correlated with rational ex- 
pectations. The second term is positive. The third term is zero if expectations 
are rational and positive if consumer beliefs exhibit "regression to the mean," 
positively  correlated  with  rational  expectations but with  smaller  deviations 
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Table 7.1  Comparative Statics of Housing Demand 
Quantity 
Income  Rental Rate  Housing Price  Capital Gains Rate 
y,  R  PI  a 
Share of owners (d = 1) 
If renter 
i 
Nonhousing consumption (8)  + 
Housing consumption (h)  + 
Financial assets (A,)  + 
Expected bequest (u”,)  + 
If owner 
Nonhousing consumption (g)  + 
Housing consumption (h)  + 
Financial assets (A,)  + 
Expected bequest (WJ  + 
I 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
+  - 
in a regression of s on one, P,, and 8 will have the signs of Cov(s, P,)  and 
Cov(s, b),  respectively. The magnitude of the coefficient of 8  will be relatively 
small if capital gains are largely anticipated, so that the conditional variance 
of 8  is small and the “bias” a -  a‘  has a low correlation with a‘. If consumers 
are naive in forming expectations, believing that k is more positively corre- 
lated with P,  than is the case, this will make the coefficient of P,  less positive 
and have relatively little effect on the coefficient of 8. 
We have argued that arbitrage by consumers, achieved by varying the level 
of housing consumption and by  moving between rental and owner housing, 
should limit but not eliminate anticipated capital gains. The behavior of supply 
will also affect the transmission  of demographic trends into housing prices. 
Poterba (1984), Topel and Rosen (1988), and McFadden (19944 have found 
aggregate supply of  new housing to be quite price-elastic,  with  elasticities 
around 2. Further, real housing investment has averaged 5.3 percent of real 
constant-quality stocks over the period 1900-1990, and the elasticity of stocks 
with respect to price is quite low, about 0.11. Then, one would expect short- 
run changes in housing demand to induce substantial short-run variations in 
housing prices. However, developers do have some control over the timing of 
completion and marketing of new houses, giving them some arbitrage opportu- 
nities when there are large anticipated capital gains or losses. 
We conclude from this analysis that rational consumers should display be- 
havioral response to anticipated capital gains, although arbitrage will limit the 
magnitude of these gains. If consumers expect no correlation between initial 
information and future price changes, so that there are no anticipated capital 
gains, then comparative statics suggests that ex post savings rates are likely to 
be negatively correlated with initial housing prices and correlated dollar for 
dollar with ex post realized capital gains. On the other hand, if arbitrage does 
not eliminate anticipated capital gains, and these are forecastable in part from 160  Hilary W.  Hoynes and Daniel L. McFadden 
initial housing prices and other information, then ex post savings can be posi- 
tively correlated with initial house prices. Further, there may be some behav- 
ioral offset to the savings these capital gains are expected to generate. 
7.2.2  Demographics and Housing Consumption 
An empirical examination of demographics and housing consumption can 
be made using U.S. census public-use samples of 0.1 percent of the population, 
which give household size and age composition, status as a renter or owner, 
and owner-reported dwelling value. McFadden (1994a) analyzes the  1940, 
1960, 1970, and 1980 census samples, adapting a model suggested by Mankiw 
and Weil(l989): 
I 
where h indexes households, t indexes year, j  = 0, . . . ,  J indexes five-year age 
cohorts, V,,, is stated dwelling value, KJhr  is the number of persons in cohort j 
in household h, aJt  is the imputed housing consumption of individuals in cohort 
j  in year t, and chr  is a disturbance. This model applies to homeowners. To 
correct for bias due to self-selection between owning and renting, a probit 
model is first estimated for tenure choice, using observations on both owners 
and renters: 
(11) 
where yhr  is real household income. Then, an inverse Mills ratio is calculated 
from this probit equation and added to equation (10) to absorb the nonzero 
conditional expectation of  chr  induced by  selection. Figure 7.1, adapted from 
McFadden (1994a), plots the coefficients from the selection-adjusted regres- 
sions, relative to the age 40-44  cohort, for each census year. These profiles are 
remarkably stable between 1960 and  1980. The profile for 1940 shows less 
relative housing consumption for the cohorts between ages 25 and 39 than is 
observed in the later censuses. This is almost certainly attributable to the lack 
of consumer confidence and shortage of liquidity during the Great Depression, 
when these cohorts might normally have been rapidly increasing their housing 
consumption. This figure provides empirical justification for an assumption 
that the relative housing consumption profile will remain stable in the future. 
Figure 7.2 gives the 1970 profile, which will be used for further computation, 
with 95 percent confidence bounds. The profile is quite precisely determined 
except for the very old, where sample sizes are small. 
McFadden (1994a) summarizes U.S. census data on population by  sex and 
five-year age cohort in census years from 1900 through 1990, using Current 
Population Reports and contemporaneous life tables to interpolate in the early 
part of the century. He then uses the cohort-component projection procedure, 
combined with 1989 U.S. census “midrange” assumptions on fertility, mortal- 
I 
Pr(owner)  = ‘(YO  + YlYht + YgEr + c  PjrK,hr)7 
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Source: McFadden (1994a). 
1970 Housing consumption (with 95 percent confidence bounds) 
ity, and immigration, to project population by  age cohort in the coming cen- 
tury.  Figure  7.3  shows  historical  and  projected  population  and  housing- 
consumption-equivalent  population, in which each age cohort is scaled to its 
equivalent numbers of  age 40-44  persons using the coefficients from figure 
7.2.  Qualitatively, the  equivalent population curve shows relatively  steady 
growth from the beginning of the century until about 1975, rises more rapidly 
from 1975 to 1990 as the post-World  War I1 baby boomers formed households 
and acquired houses, and is forecast to rise much more slowly after 1990, be- 
coming essentially flat after 2020. 
Equivalent population has a correlation of 0.964 with real constant-quality 
housing stock over the period 1900-1990 and a correlation of 0.904 with hous- 
ing prices measured by  the GNP implicit price deflator. Further evidence on 
the correlation of changes in equivalent population and housing prices is ob- 
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metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs) during the decade of the 1980s. We use 
American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association (ACCRA) data on 
prices of “standard 3 bedroom, 2 bath one-family houses suitable for a mid- 
management level owner” (ACCRA 1992). These data are obtained from quar- 
terly surveys of homebuilders, mortgage bankers, appraisers, and savings and 
loan officers. Respondents were asked for sales prices of new homes meeting 
the criteria above and an additional list of  detailed specifications. If no new 
homes meeting the specifications were marketed, then recent resale  homes 
were asked for. A drawback of these prices is that they are not representative of 
the total housing market and may not be accurate for low-income consumers. 
Missing quarters are imputed by interpolation. In some cases, missing observa- 
tions in are imputed by  the following method: The National Association  of 
Realtors Home Sales and Home Sales Yearbook provide data on median sales 
prices of resale one-family homes by year and MSA (National Association of 
Realtors 1990). For all MSAs where both the ACCRA and Realtors series are 
available, we form the ratio of their (unweighted) means in each year. Then we 
deflate the Realtors series using these ratios and use this deflated series to fill 
in missing observations in the ACCRA series. The effect of  the deflation is to 
remove quality changes in the Realtors series that are held  constant in the 
ACCRA series. The final extended ACCRA series is then in nominal dollars 
and is substantially but not completely adjusted to remove quality changes. 
The housing price data show substantial variation across MSAs. Figure 7.4 
shows the distribution of rates of price changes, deflated by the CPI, from 1984 
to 1989; the observations on which this distribution is based are weighted by 
MSA population. Some perspective on the consistency of these prices is pro- 
vided by comparing them with median house values in the MSAs in census 
years. There is a mismatch in years (1984-89  for ACCRA,  1980-90  for the 
census), with some significant macroeconomic changes in the nonoverlapping 
period. Also, the census values are not quality-adjusted. Figure 7.5 shows a 
scatter plot of the two price series, along with a fit of census price changes to 
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I 
as Peoria, Grand Rapids, York, and Lancaster, are outliers. Nevertheless, the 
correlation of the two variables is 0.56. 
Equivalent  population  for each  MSA  is  approximated  by  applying  the 
cohort-size-weighted average coefficients from figure 7.2 to the population age 
segments 0-18,  19-64,  and 65+. For  1970, these age distributions were not 
available by MSA, so the corresponding age distribution in the state containing 
the MSA was used. Changes in equivalent population are quite forecastable in 
the short run, even at the MSA level. A regression of  the rate of equivalent 
population change in 1980-90  on the rate of equivalent population change in 
1970-80, plus a constant and the rate of change of real median prices in 1970- 
80, gives a multiple correlation coefficient of 0.407, with the lagged equivalent 
population change providing most of the explanatory power. The correlation 
of  1970-80 equivalent population change and 1980-90 equivalent population 
change is 0.618. 
Figure 7.6 gives the scatter plot for the rates of change in real housing prices 164  Hilary W.  Hoynes and Daniel L. McFadden 
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Fig. 7.6  Population and housing prices (rates of change) 
Source; Authors’ tabulation. 
over 1984-89 and population over 1980-90. The figure also shows a regression 
through these points: 
(12) 
log(Price,price,,)  = 0.050 -  0.175  log  Equiv. pop.,fiquiv.  pop.,,  .  (  1 
(0.029)  (0.146) 
Our comparative statics analysis suggests that price changes and population 
changes should be positively correlated in the market, even when the popula- 
tion change is fully anticipated. Unanticipated changes in population should 
have a stronger positive impact since they will not have increased initial prices 
via reduced user cost, which increases initial demand. However, the regression 
does not show the expected positive correlation between housing price change 
and equivalent population change and suggests instead that population changes 
are fully anticipated and actively arbitraged away. However, there are also sev- 
eral econometric reasons the regression might fail to exhibit the expected ef- 
fects, including variations in income growth or economic conditions across 
MSAs that are omitted from the model, speculative “bubbles” in prices that 
increase variance and produce outliers, or measurement problems related to 
the definition of MSA boundaries and the distribution of home sales within 
each MSA. In addition, there may be self-selection between homeowners and 
renters that is related to population growth, and there may be endogeneity of 
population growth, which may respond to price differentials. Examination of 
the scatter plot suggests that there are outliers. However, a least absolute devia- 
tions regression that reduces the influence of outliers does not change the coef- 
ficients substantially. 
Extending this analysis, we ask whether housing price changes are predict- 
able from initial information on housing price levels (which may be correlates 
of past population growth) and the rate of change in population growth. The re- 
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Equiv. pop.,,  (13)  logr-)  = 0.098 + 0.188 .  log 
Price,, 
(I  .328)  (0.202) 
Equiv. pop.,,  i  Equiv. pop.,, 




-0.112  . log 
(0.075) 
(0.117) 
+ 0.011 -  log(Price,,) 
has R2 = 0.108, indicating that the initial information embodied in historical 
housing prices and current population growth has little predictive power but 
that past population growth does have some predictive power. 
A  second implication of  the housing market model is that as a result of 
arbitrage the level of housing prices should be higher in markets where popula- 
tion growth is higher. To test this, we regress 1984 price on the rates of popula- 
tion change in  1970-80  and  1980-90  and on the  1970-80  rate of  housing 
price change: 
Equiv. pop.9o 
Equiv. pop.,,  (14)  log(Price,,)  = 11.296 + 0.372 . log 
-  0.072 . log (:el  Equiv. pop., 
Equiv  pop 
(0.070)  (0.169) 
(0.156) 
Median price,, 
Median price,,  + 0.040 . log (-. 
(0.064) 
This regression indicates that initial price is positively related to future popula- 
tion  growth but  is not  related to  past  rates of  price change or population 
growth. This suggests that demographic effects are largely translated by arbi- 
trage into initial prices, and consumers are primarily affected through these 
price changes rather than through capital gains. 
Sharper, and  somewhat different, results are obtained when  the  rate  of 
growth of median house values, as reported by  the census, is used instead of 
the ACCRA  measure: 
Equiv. pop.,, 
Equiv. pop.,, 
= 1.042 + 0.893 . log 
(1.076)  (0.282) 
(0.105) 
Median price,, 
Median price,,  (15)  1%  ( 









-  0.531 . log 
(0.11 1) 
This regression has R2 = 0.35, suggesting that real housing price changes are 
forecastable. Contemporaneous population growth has predictive power and is 
positively correlated with price changes. The effect of lagged price change is 
negative, suggesting that the market overshoots. Measurement error in census 
data should be modest but if  present could also explain the last effect. The 
negative sign on past population  growth rates also suggests a market cycle, 
with “spurts” of past population growth that are uncorrelated with current pop- 
ulation  growth possibly  leading to  “overbuilding,” which creates downward 
pressure on market prices. 
Since there is moderately good agreement between the ACCRA and census 
prices, it is surprising that regressions (13) and (15) are substantially different. 
In further analysis, we will use the ACCRA prices, which match the dates of 
the savings data to be analyzed. For the critical question of behavioral response 
in savings, we will repeat the analysis using the apparently more forecastable 
census prices. 
The pattern of results for MSAs with census median house prices is con- 
firmed by  an  analysis  of  changes in population  and  housing prices  across 
states. We  use the median of  owner-reported  dwelling values by  state, not 
quality-adjusted, from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 U.S. censuses. We use state  -  -- 
equivalent population,  constructed in the same way  as the 
populations. The regressions analogous to (14) and (1  5) are 
i 
Equiv. pop.9o  i  Equiv. pop.,, 
(I6)  log(Price,,)  = 10.813 + 1.849 . log 




- 1.080 . log 
(0.469) 
Median price,, 
Median price,,  + 1.083 *  log ( 
.  .I 
(0.304) 
MSA equivalent 
Equiv. pop.9o  i  Equiv. pop.,,, 
= -  2.391 + 1.580 . log 
(1.317)  (0.481) 
Median price,, 
Median price,, 
(17)  log ( 
+ 0.258 .  log(Price,,) 
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Equiv. pop.,, 
Equiv. pop.,, 
-  1.187 . log 




Equation (16) has R2 = 0.336. Initial prices appear to be related to future popu- 
lation growth, indicating that arbitrage occurs. The terms involving equivalent 





Then initial price is positively related to the rate of change of future population 
and to the rate of acceleration of equivalent population. 
Equation (17) has R2 = 0.581, so housing price changes appear to be fore- 
castable, with current and lagged equivalent population growth and lagged 
price changes all significant. The directions of the effects are the same as were 
found in the MSA data. Again, the effects of equivalent population changes 
can be reinterpreted as positive response to contemporaneous equivalent popu- 
lation growth (with a coefficient of  0.393) and to the rate of  acceleration of 
equivalent population (with a coefficient of  1.187). 
The analysis above with ACCRA prices suggests that demographic effects 
are largely anticipated and arbitraged away in the housing market so that initial 
prices embody current information about forecastable trends. Because there 
are essentially no surprises in population growth over a decade, even at the 
MSA level, there is no significant correlation of ex post population change and 
ex post price change. However, using census prices, there appears to be evi- 
dence for a substantial forecastable component in housing prices. We  have in- 
dicated several possible sources of differences in the two price series but have 
not identified any key features that would lead to the differences in fitted re- 
gressions using the two different sources. If the market is not perfectly efficient 
and there is substantial forecastability, then there is at least scope for a behav- 
ioral response that would mitigate some of the adverse effects of demographic 
changes that are expected to weaken the housing market and reduce real capi- 
tal gains. 
Over the 40-year horizon facing a 30-year-old prospective home buyer, birth 
rates and consequent changes in equivalent population are not so highly fore- 
castable, and one would expect to see a significant positive correlation of ex 
post population changes and ex post price changes. These conclusions have 
several implications for life-cycle savings behavior. First, if  arbitrage elimi- 
nates most forecastable capital gains, then there is little room for demographics 
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run, the demographic effects may contain innovations that will result in ex post 
capital gains, but since these are not forecastable, they cannot alter savings 
behavior. Then most demographic change should have relatively little ex ante 
impact on behavior, with the consequence that the effects of demographics on 
market prices should translate directly into changes in welfare, particularly as 
a result of unanticipated changes late in life. 
7.3  Wealth, Expectations, and Savings 
7.3.1  Background 
In this section we explore the role of  ex post measures of capital gains in 
the housing market on household savings decisions. Equity in housing has tra- 
ditionally represented a major component of  household wealth in the United 
States. Feinstein and McFadden (1989), Venti and Wise (1990), and McFadden 
(1994b) have found that housing equity represents more than 50 percent of 
total wealth in the population over age 65. Housing wealth has increased with 
age, at least in the past decade, except for the very old, but extraction of equity 
becomes an important resource after age 75. The trend of rising house prices 
that has typified the U.S. market for past decades, as noted by  McFadden 
(1994a), has translated into increases in wealth for current cohorts of elderly 
homeowners. However, Mankiw and Weil(l989) and McFadden (1994a) have 
argued that population aging in the United States in the coming three decades 
is likely to result in a reversal of  these trends in housing prices. McFadden 
(1994a) finds that a potential implication of this reversal is capital losses ac- 
companied by nontrivial welfare losses for younger cohorts of current home- 
owners, However, if households can anticipate changes in housing prices, and 
if  they adjust their nonhousing savings accordingly, welfare losses in retire- 
ment  could be  mitigated. The empirical question that  we  examine in  this 
section is how household savings decisions are affected by  capital gains in 
housing. 
Section 7.2 presented a simple two-period model of consumption and sav- 
ings. An implication of that model is that consumers should show some savings 
behavior response to the level of housing prices, essentially because housing 
demand is inelastic, housing consumption cannot be reduced sufficiently to 
reduce equity, and compensating adjustments in financial savings are not fully 
offsetting, Another implication is that ex ante savings rates should respond 
positively to a change in beliefs that increases expected capital gains. Ex post 
savings rates, which incorporate realized capital gains, will reflect this depen- 
dence in addition to the dependence built into the accounting. However, if capi- 
tal gains cannot be forecast from current information, including demographic 
trends, then only the accounting dependence will be observed. The results in 
section 7.2 suggest that this may indeed be the case. This should be seen most 
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Of  course, if consumers are irrational in their beliefs and fail to use available 
information, then a behavioral response may be absent even if capital gains are 
in principle forecastable. 
Recent data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) provides an 
excellent source for the analysis of savings among elderly households. Com- 
prehensive data on housing and nonhousing wealth was collected in 1984 and 
1989 for over 7,000 households. We  use this wealth data to form measures of 
real savings rates over the five-year period. Data on average housing prices by 
MSA are used to form ex post real capital gain rates over the 1984-89 period, 
which are then matched to each household in the PSID based on their county 
of residence. If consumers can predict changes in housing prices and have full 
behavioral offset in savings, then we would expect to see very low correlation 
between changes in area housing prices and savings rates. However, if individ- 
uals are naive in forming expectations or do not adjust savings, then we would 
expect to see a positive correlation between ex post savings rates and ex post 
capital gains in housing, as suggested by  equations (8) and (9) derived from 
the two-period model. 
The MSA-level regression results in section 7.2 present somewhat mixed 
evidence concerning the degree to which capital gains in housing are fore- 
castable based on current information, including demographics. In view  of 
these results, the household-level savings regressions in this section use both 
sources of housing price data, those from ACCRA and from the census. 
We  present estimates of  the effect of  changes in housing prices on total, 
housing, and nonhousing savings rates. These regressions contain controls for 
age of head, health status, demographic characteristics such as marital status, 
race, education, and sex of head, and income and initial wealth. 
7.3.2  Data and Definitions 
The data used for our analysis of the determinants of household savings are 
drawn from the PSID, a longitudinal data set collected by the Institute for So- 
cial Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan, which began in 1968 with 
a sample of about 5,000 households containing 18,000 individuals. All mem- 
bers  (and  descendants)  of  these  original  survey  families  have  been  rein- 
terviewed annually such that by the twenty-second year of the panel, more than 
38,000  individuals have participated or are currently participating in the survey. 
All estimates presented here are based on the 1968-89 (or Wave XXII) sample 
of the PSID. 
The PSID contains a detailed accounting of wealth for all survey households 
in  1984 and 1989. Using these data, we construct measures of  net worth in 
1984 and 1989 that include home equity (house value less remaining princi- 
pal), other real estate equity, financial assets (savings accounts, money market 
accounts, CDs, treasury bills, mutual funds, stocks, and bonds), business eq- 
uity, and vehicle equity, less household debt. In an assessment of  quality of 
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that the PSID provides wealth data that is “of surprisingly high quality, relative 
to the quality obtainable with much more intensive survey methods and higher 
costs per case” (477). In addition to the wealth data, the PSID contains data on 
health status, demographic variables, family composition, household income, 
and state and county of residence. The demographic data used in this analysis 
includes age, education, marital status, sex, and race of the head of household. 
We limit the sample to include those households that had stable family com- 
positions over the 1984-89 period. Primarily, we seek to exclude those families 
where there was a divorce, marriage, or remarriage during the five-year period. 
We  choose to limit our analysis to these intact households because a major 
change in family composition, such as marriage or divorce, could have a large 
impact on the savings rate over this period that is not necessarily attributable 
to life-cycle savings behavior. There are a total of 7,114 households in the 1989 
sample of the PSID, of which 4,719 satisfy our definition of an intact family. 
We further limit the sample by excluding families where the head of household 
was less than 30 years old and dropping observations  with missing data on 
demographic variables, resulting in a sample with 4,360 observations.2 
The PSID data are augmented with data on changes in housing prices by 
MSA from two different sources. The first source comes from ACCRA and 
covers the period 1984-89; the second source is the decennial census and cov- 
ers the years 1980-90.3 The ACCRA data are attractive because they measure 
constant-quality housing price for the same period that the PSID savings rate 
is  measured. The census data represent  owner-reported house  value.  Both 
sources of data are available at the MSA or PMSA level. Because the PSID 
identifies county of residence, not MSA, we merge the housing price data with 
the PSID data using a Census Bureau file that maps counties into MSAs. About 
27 percent of the households in our sample live in counties that are not part of 
one of the 112 PMSAs or MSAs represented in the ACCRA data. In addition, 
price data were not available for the entire 1984-89 period for all of the MSAs. 
The resulting number of observations with data on area housing prices from 
ACCRA is 2,427.4 Capital gains from housing are measured by the logarithm 
of the ratio of real housing prices in 1989 to real housing prices in 1984. 
The dependent variable in the regressions is real savings rate over the five- 
2. Our sample selection is designed to identify those households where there was no change in 
the head or spouse over the five-year period. The one exception is that we include those households 
where the head or spouse died between  1984 and 1989 but the surviving spouse did not remarry. 
Those households with no change in the head or spouse represent almost 98 percent of the observa- 
tions in our data set. Overall, in the PSID, over 70 percent of the households in the 1989 sample 
had  no change in the head or spouse between  1984 and  1989. We  do not  limit the sample to 
homeowners because one of the implications of the model in section 7.2 is that it may be optimal 
to change ownership status in response to anticipated capital gains or losses. 
3. Both sources of housing price data are described in more detail in section 7.2.2. 
4. We are able to assign housing price  data to 2,694 of  the 4,360 observations  in  the intact 
sample. The sample is reduced further to 2,427 observations by  dropping those households that 
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year period 1984-89. The savings rate is defined as the difference between real 
wealth in 1989 and real wealth in 1984 divided by the sum of real income over 
the period 1984-88,5 
w8Y  -  w84  P84 
1988  s= 
1=1Y84 
In order to explore the effect of capital gains in housing on savings, we split 
total savings into its housing and nonhousing components. Wealth in each of 
the years can be easily separated into equity in housing and all nonhousing 
wealth. Housing wealth includes equity in the home and all other real estate 
equity, while nonhousing wealth includes financial assets (liquid assets, stocks, 
and bonds),  business equity, and vehicle equity, less household debt. Using 
these wealth measures, the total savings rate over the period is separated into 
housing savings and nonhousing savings rates. 
Summary statistics for the sample of all intact families from the PSID are 
provided in table 7.2. Table 7.3 provides descriptive statistics for the subsample 
with housing price data. In order to minimize the impact of outliers in savings 
rates, we drop observations in the top and bottom 2.5 percent of the total sav- 
ings rate distribution.6 The final sample sizes are 4,142 for all intact families 
and 2,331 for the sample of  intact households with area housing price data.’ 
Table 7.2 shows that mean wealth (in 1989 dollars) increased from $72,647 in 
1984 to $95,707 in  1989. The real  savings rate averaged 7.3 percent,  about 
equally split between housing and nonhousing savings. The average age of the 
head of household in 1989 was 49, and over 1,180 families had a head over the 
age of 60. The health status variable is self-reported health status of the head 
in 1984. The values range from 1 (excellent) to 5 (very poor). Over half of the 
sample reports health to be excellent or very good. Sixty-three percent of the 
households are mamed couple households, and about 72 percent are headed 
by men. The sample of households in MSAs have slightly higher wealth, sav- 
ings rates, and income. They are older and more likely to be single, black, and 
headed by a female. Average housing price (in  1989 dollars) increased from 
5. The wealth data correspond to the years 1984 and 1989. To create the savings rate, we divide 
by total (real) income received in the period between the wealth assessments. This corresponds to 
income received in 1984-88. In the PSID, income received in calendar year t is reported in survey 
year t + 1. Therefore, total income is the real sum of income from calendar years 1984-88,  or 
survey years 1985-89. 
6. Trimming the data in this way drops observations with savings rates of less than -  118 percent 
or more than 133 percent. There seem to be a few extreme outliers in the data, such as a savings 
rate of over 10,000  percent, and the estimates are sensitive to the exclusion of these outliers. Other 
than dropping these extreme outliers, the results are not sensitive to the amount of  trimming of 
the data. 
7. Note that these sample counts are for the ACCRA housing price data. The sample sizes are 
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Table 7.2  Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample of Intact Households, 1984-89 
Standard 
Statistic  Mean  Deviation  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
Total wealth 1984a 
Housing wealth 
Nonhousing wealth 





















Education 9-1  1 
Education 12 
Education 13-15 
Education 2 16 
N 
72,647  174.684  27.569  -2 16.200  5,752,500 








-  107,400 
5,633,100 
7,460,000 
50.572  94,727  21.500  -  100,000  2,270,000 
45.135  182.374  9.500  -  126.800  6,675,000 
0.073  0.321  0.027  -1.147  1.326 
0.039  0.255  0.000  -2.326  2.228 
0.034  0.244  0.008  -  1.873  1.946 























Source: Authors’ tabulations from the 1989 PSID. See text for definition of sample. 
dAll  dollar amounts are in 1989 dollars. 
bunless  otherwise specified, all demographic characteristics are for the head of household in  1989. 
$114,000 in 1984 to $130,952 in 1989, representing a increase of 9.2 percent. 
Figure 7.4 shows that there is large variation in the housing growth rate over 
this period. Over 50 percent of the sample had real growth between 10 and 50 
percent, while about a third of the sample had capital losses. 
7.3.3  Life-Cycle Savings and Wealth 
The PSID data show large differences in the level and composition of wealth 
and savings by  age of  head of  household. Figure 7.7 provides estimates for 
mean wealth in 1989 by age of head of household, and figure 7.8 plots median 173  Impact of Demographics on U.S. Housing and Nonhousing Wealth 
Table 7.3  Descriptive Statistics: Intact Households with MSA Housing Prices, 1984-89 
Standard 
Statistic  Mean  Deviation  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
Total wealth 1984a 
Housing wealth 
Nonhousing wealth 
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Source: Authors’ tabulations from the 1989 PSID. See text for definition of sample. 
.‘All dollar amounts are in 1989 dollars. 
hUnless otherwise specified, all demographic characteristics are for the head of household in 1989 
wealth  by  age of head of household.8 Mean wealth  rises  steeply from ages 
30-34  to ages 60-64,  an increase from $34,000 to $160,000. Wealth falls to 
about $100,000 for ages 75 and over. Median wealth also follows this hump- 
8. Means by  five-year age class are fairly precisely estimated because cell sizes average 200- 
350. The exception is the oldest age group (85+),  which is imprecisely estimated because sample 
size is 47. 174  Hilary W.  Hoynes and Daniel L. McFadden 
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Fig. 7.7  Mean wealth by age of head of household 
Source: Authors’ tabulation from the 1989 PSID. 
_-____  -.  70- 
50--  -  ___ 
-  . 
-- 
0- i  , 
30-34  35-39  40-44  45-49  5054  55-59  6064  65-69  7074  75-79  80-84  85+ 
Age  01  Head 1989 
+  Total Wealth  I  Housing Wealth  +  Non-Housing  Wealth  I 
Fig. 7.8  Median wealth by age of head of household 
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Fig. 7.9  Housing wealth as a percentage of total wealth by age of head of 
household 
Source; Authors'  tabulation from the PSID. 
shaped pattern, but because of the highly skewed nature of  wealth, the levels 
are consistently lower. Median wealth rises from $13,020 for households with 
heads  aged  30-34  to  $70,000  for  those  aged  60-64,  then  falls  to  about 
$40,000-$50,000 for those aged 70 and over.9 
Figures 7.7 and 7.8 also plot the housing and nonhousing components of 
household wealth. The hump-shaped pattern for wealth is particularly apparent 
for housing wealth, but it is not apparent for nonhousing wealth. Median hous- 
ing wealth falls from $40,000 among those aged 55-64  to $20,000 for those 
aged 80 and over. At the same time, median nonhousing wealth remains fairly 
constant over this age range. 
Housing wealth represents the single most important part of total household 
wealth among families in the United States. Among our sample of intact fami- 
lies in the PSID data, housing wealth represents, on average, over half of total 
wealth. As shown in figure 7.9, the relative importance of housing wealth var- 
ies dramatically over the life cycle. Among younger families homeownership 
is low; housing wealth peaks as a percentage of total wealth at ages 60-64  and 
then decreases. Housing wealth as a percentage of total wealth increases from 
about 35 percent among the youngest cohort to a high of over 55 percent for 
9. Because we are only using one year of wealth data, these age effects of wealth could also be 
generated by  cohort effects. That is, those aged 80-84  in the data also belong to the same birth 
cohort. These data do not allow for the separate identification of age effects and cohort effects. 
For an analysis of  financial wealth holdings by age and birth cohort, see Attanasio (1993). 176  Hilary W.  Hoynes and Daniel L. McFadden 
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Fig. 7.10 
Source. Authors'  tabulation from the 1984-89  PSID. 
Mean five-year savings rate by age of head of household in 1989 
those aged 60-64,  then falls to about 40 percent of  total wealth for those in 
the oldest cohorts. 
Figure 7.10 summarizes the life-cycle pattern of  total, housing, and non- 
housing savings rates over the period  1984-89.  Between the ages of  35 and 
60, the total savings rate averages about 9 percent of real income over the five- 
year period. After age 60, the savings rate decreases to about 5 percent and 
eventually turns negative only at the highest age levels. Housing savings fol- 
lows this same pattern, with lower savings rates among the elderly. Nonhousing 
savings, however, remain more steady over the life cycle. 
7.3.4  Savings Rates and Capital Gains in Housing 
This section investigates the effect of changes in housing prices on five-year 
savings rates using a sample of intact families from the PSID. As described 
above, the savings rate data correspond to the period  1984-89.  The housing 
price data refer to price changes for the MSA that the family resides in. The 
ACCRA housing price data cover the years  1984-89,  while the census data 
cover the years 1980-90. 
Table 7.4A presents parameter estimates for regressions where the depen- 
dent variable is the total savings rate.Io Model (1) relates savings rates to age 
10. For each of the models reported in this section, the dependent variable is the savings rate 
multiplied by 100. Table 7.4A  Parameter Estimates for Savings Rate Regressions Where Dependent Variable = Total Savings Rate: Capital Gains in 
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(2.887) Table 7.4A  (continued) 
Model 
~ 
Health status  -1.132  -  1.473  -1.518  -0.776 
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41-60  18.923 
(6.417) log(HPKY  891 
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(0.459)  (0.627  j 




0.0027  0.0276  0.062  I  0.0693  0.063  I  0.0626  0.0654  0.0825 
4, I42  4, I42  233  1  2.33 I  1,996  1,996  1,996  1,996 
Norrt Based on authors’ tabulations from the 1989 PSID. See text for description of sample selection. The dependent variable is the real savings rate over the 
five-year period 1984-89, which is calculated by dividing the change in real wealth by real income over the five-year period. All specifications include controls 
for age, sex, race, education, marital status, and health status of the head of household. All dollar amounts are in 1989 dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
.‘ACCRA data for constant-quality housing prices. 
hPopulation  by  MSA from decennial census. 
‘Median home value (not quality-adjusted) from decennial census by MSA. 
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Table 7.4B  Parameter Estimates for Savings Rate Regressions Where Dependent 
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Note: See table 7.4A note. 
,‘Median home value (not quality-adjusted) from decennial census by MSA. 
hPopulation  by MSA from decennial census. 
of  head of  household,  and the results imply a hump-shaped  age profile. As 
shown in figure 7.10, the savings rate decreases with age beginning at about 
age 45. Model  (2)  considers a larger set of  demographic  variables. Savings 
rates are found to be higher for married couples and those families whose head 
of household  is nonblack or male. However, neither sex nor race of head of 
household is found to significantly affect savings rates. Higher education levels 
(education  of  the  head)  are associated  with  higher  rates  of  savings.  Self- 181  Impact of Demographics on U.S. Housing and Nonhousing Wealth 
reported health of the head in 1984 is associated with lower levels of savings. 
This is consistent with the evidence in Attanasio and Hoynes (1995), where 
lower levels of household wealth are associated with higher levels of mortality 
risk. Controlling for these demographic variables shifts out the age profile for 
savings rates. The parameter estimates in model (2) imply that savings rates 
are maximized at age 56 and decline after. 
The next three models add capital gains in housing prices for the MSA of 
residence to the savings rate regression." These housing price data correspond 
to 1984-89  and are from ACCRA. The housing price variable is constructed 
as the logarithm of the ratio of real housing prices in  1989 to real housing 
prices in 1984. The estimates in model (3) imply that an increase in the growth 
rate of real housing prices of 10 percentage points will lead, on average, to an 
increase in the total savings rate of  2.28 percentage points, or an increase of 
37 percent. What does this suggest for the amount of  behavioral offset that 
households are engaging in? At mean levels of income and wealth, an addi- 
tional real increase of 10 percentage points in home value (with no offsetting 
change in savings) will lead to an increase in the savings rate of 3.10 percent- 
age  points.  If  individuals are,  in  fact,  forming  correct  expectations  about 
changes in housing prices, then these estimates suggest that they are making 
(at the most) very minor changes to their nonhousing savings. 
This result can also be seen by  considering the effect of capital gains in 
housing  on housing and  nonhousing savings rates.  Parameter estimates for 
the housing savings rate regressions are presented in table 7SA,  while the non- 
housing savings rate estimates are in table 7.6A.'* Consider the estimates for 
model (3) in tables 7.5A and 7.6A. Changes in area housing prices have the 
same effect on the housing savings rate as was found for the total savings rate. 
For  nonhousing savings, capital  gains in housing  are associated with  both 
small and statistically insignificant changes in nonhousing savings. 
The model presented in section 7.2 suggests that savings rates  should be 
correlated with the initial level of housing prices, as well as with the growth 
rate. Model (4) adds the logarithm of the 1984 housing price to the regressions. 
Increases in initial housing prices are associated with increases in the total and 
11. Note that the sample size is reduced by half when we include the MSA-level housing price 
data in the specification. As described in section 7.3.2, this is because of incomplete price data 
and because about a quarter of the PSID sample does not live in an MSA. Estimates not reported 
here suggest that there are not large differences in the role of demographic variables among these 
two samples. Because of  the smaller sample, however, the precision of the estimates generally 
is reduced. 
12. The effects of demographic variables on housing and nonhousing savings rates are similar 
to the results summarized for the total savings rate equation. Notable differences are that health 
status in 1984 is more important in determining changes in nonhousing as compared to housing 
wealth. If poor health leads to low savings rates because of an increase in medical costs, reductions 
in nonhousing wealth would be expected because of the highly illiquid nature of housing wealth. 
In addition, housing savings is found to peak at an earlier age compared to total savings rates. 
Model (2) implies that housing savings rates begin to decline at age 49, compared to age 56 for 
total savings. Table 7.5A  Parameter Estimates for Savings Rate Regressions Where Dependent Variable = Housing Savings Rate: Capital Gains in 
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1 984d 
Adjusted Rz  0.0082 
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(4.929)  (4.934) 
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Nore: See table 7.4A note. 
“ACCRA data for constant-quality housing prices. 
bPopulation by MSA from decennial census. 
‘Median home value (not quality-adjusted) from decennial census by MSA. 
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Table 7.5B  Parameter Estimates for Savings Rate Regressions Where Dependent 
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Note: See table 7.4A note. 
“Median home value (not quality-adjusted) from decennial census by MSA 
bPopulation by MSA from decennial census. 
housing savings rates but have no significant effect on nonhousing savings. A 
10 percent increase in initial housing prices increases the (total) savings rate 
by  1.4 percentage points, an increase of  about 17 percent. Finally, model (5) 
includes past measures of  population and price changes for the MSA. Neither 
of these variables affect household savings. 
The savings regressions  presented  above  assume that  the  behavioral  re- Table 7.6A  Parameter Estimates for Savings Rate Regressions Where Dependent Variable = Nonhousing Savings Rate: Capital Gains in 
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(2.568) Table 7.6A  (continued  j 
Model 
Variable  (1) 
log(POP80/POP70)h 
log(  HPRY XOIHPRY 70)' 
log(HPRY  89/HPRY  84) 
* Age 540 
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log(HPRY89/HPRY84) 
* Age > 60 
Real income  I 984-89'1 
(2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
7.159  7.2 16 
(4.377)  (4.382) 
-0.59l  -0.558 







Housing wealth  1984'' 
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I 984d 
Adjusted R'  0.0001  0.01  18  0.0206  0.0202  0.0152  0.0  142 
N  4,142  4,142  2,331  2,33  I  1,996  1,996 
Nore: See table 7.4A note. 
.'ACCRA data for constant-quality housing prices. 
hPopulation by  MSA from decennial census. 
'Median  home value (not quality-adjusted) from decennial census by  MSA. 
100.000 dollars. 
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Table 7.6B  Parameter Estimates for Savings Rate Regressions Where Dependent 
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Note: See table 7.4A note. 
“Median home value (not quality-adjusted) from decennial census by  MSA. 
hPopulation  by  MSA from decennial census. 
sponse to a given change in capital gains is constant across all households. 
Because older homeowners are closer to retirement and possibly more likely 
to be considering  selling their homes in the near future than younger home- 
owners, it is possible that the behavioral response would differ with the age of 
the household  head. Model (6) interacts the change  in housing  prices  with 
dummies for age of the household head. Our results show no significant differ- 188  Hilary W.  Hoynes and Daniel L. McFadden 
ences in the responses of households with heads less than age 40, between ages 
40 and 60, and over age 60.13 
Further, we find that adding controls for household wealth and income does 
not change the conclusions about the role of capital gains in housing. Models 
(7) and (8) in tables 7.4A, 7SA, and 7.6A show that higher household income 
and lower initial wealth are associated with higher savings rates. The results for 
wealth, however, appear to be spurious: initial housing wealth is significantly 
negatively correlated with housing savings, while initial nonhousing wealth is 
significantly negatively correlated with nonhousing savings rates. 
These savings regressions imply that households  are not engaging in any 
behavioral offset in response to changes in housing prices. However, if capital 
gains cannot be forecast from current information, then we would not expect 
to see the households engaging in any offsetting behavior. The results in sec- 
tion 7.2 suggest that, when the ACCRA data are used, housing prices are not 
forecastable from current information, including demographics. However, the 
census data imply that these gains are not arbitraged away and housing prices 
are forecastable from demographics. Tables 7.4B, 7.5B, and 7.6B present esti- 
mates for models that use the census price data to reconsider the issue of be- 
havioral offset. 
Model  (1)  in tables 7.4B, 7SB, and 7.6B includes  the  full set of demo- 
graphic  variables and the growth rate in housing  prices over  1980-90.  The 
housing price variable is constructed as the logarithm of the ratio of real hous- 
ing prices in 1990  to real housing prices in 1980. Results using the census data 
have the  same implications  about offsetting behavior as we found with  the 
ACCRA housing price data. Increases in capital gains in housing have a large 
and positive effect on both total and housing savings. The results in table 7.6B, 
however, show that there is no effect of  changes in capital gains in housing 
prices on nonhousing savings. These results are robust to the addition of 1980 
housing price (model  [2])  as well as measures of past growth in population 
and housing prices (model [3]). 
If households can perfectly predict capital gains in housing and they offset 
this change by fully adjusting nonhousing savings rates, then we would expect 
to see zero correlation  between changes in housing prices and total savings 
rates and negative correlation between changes in housing prices and nonhous- 
ing savings rates. We find neither. There are several hypotheses, however, that 
are consistent with our findings: Expectations  about capital gains in housing 
prices may not play any role in savings decisions; that is, even if consumers 
had perfect foresight about changes in housing prices, they do not change their 
savings rates to try to achieve some target total savings over the period. Alter- 
natively, expectations play a role but households are “naive” in forming these 
expectations; that is, they may not be using all available information (e.g., fore- 
13. We considered several specifications for the interaction between age and price change (e.g., 
various other dummy variable interactions and an age polynomial), and in each case there were 
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castable components of housing price changes such as demographic trends) to 
form expectations about changes in housing prices. 
7.4  Concluding Remarks 
Housing  equity represents  an  important  part of  household  wealth  in the 
United  States. Steady gains in housing  prices over the last several decades 
have generated large potential gains in household wealth among homeowners. 
Mankiw and Weil(l989) and McFadden (1994a) have argued that the popula- 
tion aging in the United States is likely to induce substantial declines in hous- 
ing prices, resulting in capital losses for future elderly generations. However, 
if households are able to anticipate these housing price changes and they mod- 
ify their nonhousing savings decisions, then potential losses may be mitigated. 
We use data on housing prices and demographic trends for 11  2 metropolitan 
statistical areas to investigate whether  housing  prices  are forecastable  from 
current information. We then estimate housing  savings rate equations using 
data on five-year savings rates from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We 
use data from two different sources to examine the effect of demographics on 
housing prices, and in future research we intend to use alternative data sources 
to further examine this important issue. 
While our results are mixed with respect to the forecastability of housing 
prices, we found no evidence that households were changing their nonhousing 
savings in response to expectations  about capital gains in housing. This lack 
of adjustment could result in large welfare losses to current homeowners and 
large intergenerational equity differences. 
Appendix 
Comparative Statics for the Housing Demand Model 
This appendix analyzes the comparative statics of housing demand and savings 
in the two-period model. Assumptions will be stated when they are first used, 
starting with the following basic assumptions: 
1.  U  is  strictly  concave  and  nondecreasing  with  V8U(0, h)  =  +-, 
V,,U(g,O) = +  -,  and V,U(g, +-)  = 0. 
2. Housing  and  nonhousing  consumption  are  normal  goods;  that  is, 
Vg(VrUIV,U) 5 0 and V,(VgUIV,v)  2 0. 
3.  V  is a constant  relative risk aversion  utility  function;  that is,  V(w) = 
-Ce-"";  where C and K are positive parameters. 
4.  All variables except k are in the consumer's initial information set 41 and 
given this information the consumer believes that k has a normal distribution 
with mean (Y and variance u2. 190  Hilary W.  Hoynes and Daniel L. McFadden 
Using the budget constraint equations (2) and (3) to eliminate A,,  one has 
(‘41)  w2  = dh~,[i  - e + (1 -  m)P]  + [i + ~-’]{w,  + (1 -  m)~, 
-n,g - (1 -  d)Rh -  dhP, (1 -  8 + k)}. 
For notational shorthand, define 
w,  = dw,  [i -  e + (1 -  mi4  + [i + r’]{w,  + (1 -  ~IY, 
-  =,g -  (1 -  d)~h  -  dh~,  (1 - e + F)), 
0  = (1  + r’)[W,  + (1 -  m)Y,], 
c = (1 + r’)[l -  e + F] -  [l - e + (1 -  m)a], 
4 = KU2(1 -  m)’/71,, 
v = exp{  --:;[w  -  (1 + r’)nlg 
-  (1 -  d)(l + r’)Rh -  dhP,c -  PyPd-  . 
2  ql  I 
Then W2  is the consumer’s expected final wealth, w is total initial wealth, c is 
the user cost of housing, q is a risk penalty, and V appears in the expression 
for expected utility of bequests: 
(‘42)  E V(W2/~,)  = - C . V. 
Substituting this expression into the consumer’s objective function gives the 
problem 
(A31  max,,  U(g,  h) - C . V. 
The first-order conditions for this unconstrained problem are 
(‘44) 
where 
U,U  = b,C  . V, 
V,U = b,C  . V, 
‘11 
(OgV)/V = bg = (1 + r’)~~, 
TZ 
K 
(V,V)IV = b,  -  [(l + r’)R(1 -  d) + dP,c + dhPiq1. 
=2 
Similarly, 
(UwV)/V = bw = --InTT,, 




(O,,V)/V  = b,,  = -dh[c  + qhP,], 
712 
K 
(VaV)/V = ba  -  1(  1 + r’)-(  1 -  m)dhP,. 
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Define the matrix 
1 
UK8U  -  biC  *  U  UK,U -  bxb,C ' U 
K 
M=[  U,,U  -  b,b,C  . U  U,,U  -  biC . U - --dP:qC  . V  ' 
'IT2 
Note that M is the sum of 
which is negative definite, and 
which is negative semidefinite. Hence, det M > 0,  and 
Define the vectors 
A_ = 
The derivatives needed for comparative statics analysis are obtained by differ- 
entiating the first-order conditions: 
I 
M [  21  = C . U {A-dw  + ApldP,  + A,dR  + Auda 
First, incomelwealth effects satisfy 
The terms bgV,,U -  bhVhKU  5 0 and b,,VggU  -  bxVghU  5 0 by normality, along 
with b_ < 0, imply that g and h are increasing  in w.  Let E(g, x) = dlog(g)/ 192  Hilary W.  Hoynes and Daniel L. McFadden 
dlog(x) denote the elasticity of a variable g with respect to a variable x. The 
following assumption appears to be supported empirically: 
5. The elasticities of g and h with respect to o  are less than one. 
This assumption implies 
- [(l -  d)(l + r')Rh + dhP,(l -  0 + /.L)]E(~,  0)  2  A,, 
and for ci such that expected net equity 1 -  0 + (1 -  m)ci is positive, 
-  dhP,[1 -  0 + (1 -  m)ci]s(h,  w) 2 W2 . 
Second, increasing R has no effect on owners and for renters satisfies 
ah/aR  - 
L  J 
K 
b,(b,V,,U  -  bhVhgU)  -  -(I  + r')(b,b,C.V -  VRhUJ 
=2 
b, (-bgVRhU  + bhVggU)  - K-(1  + r'){b:C*V -  V,,U) 
=2 
Then dhldR < 0. The cross-price effect dgldR is negative if g and h are not 
very substitutable, and the income effect dominates. The effect of increasing 
R on financial assets, and hence on savings, is negative if h is inelastic with 
respect to R and the cross-price effect of R on g is weak. 
Third, increasing PI  has no effect on renters and for owners satisfies 
K 
b,,(b,V,,U  -  b,,V,,U) -  -(c  + 2hP,q)(b,b,C.V  -  V,,,U) 
=2 
det  K 
b,,  (-bgVB,U + bhVg8U)  -  -(c  + 2hP,q){biC.V -  VggU} 
L[  *2 
Then dh/dP, < 0. The cross-price effect dgldP, is negative if g and h are not 
very substitutable, and the income effect dominates. The effects of increasing 
PI  on financial assets and final expected wealth satisfy 
aA,IaP, = -h[i + &(h,  PJ(~  -  0 + p) -  vr,ag/ap,, 
aW2/aP,  = -h[l  + s(h,  P,)]c -  (1 + r').rr,dgldP, . 
If h is inelastic with respect to PI  and the cross-price effect of PI  on g is weak, 
then dA,IdP, is negative and dW21dPI  is small negative. 193  Impact of Demographics on U.S. Housing and Nonhousing Wealth 
Fourth, increasing ci has no effect on renters and for owners satisfies 
[:2:]  = 
K 
ba(bXVhhU  -  bhVhqU)  -  -(1  -  rn)P,(bsbhCV - Vp,,U) 
detM  ba(-bsVphU  + b,,VggU)  - K(l  -  m)P,(biC.V -  V,,U] 
=2 
=2 
When risk aversion is moderate, the leading terms will dominate, and aglaci 
and dhlda will both be positive. The effect of a  on W2  satisfies 
aw2iaa  = h~,(i  -  m)  + (1 + r’)aA,laa 
+ PI[  1 -  0  + (1 -  rn)alah/&  . 
This expression is positive when risk aversion is moderate. 
The preceding analysis assumed that the PI  and a  varied independently. In 
practice, the consumer will use the initial information, including PI,  in forming 
expectations. If the consumer is rational, this dependence will reflect the statis- 
tical dependence of  on PI.  If the consumer is irrational, having for example 
naive expectations that past rates of increase in prices reflected in PI  will con- 
tinue, this will also make ci positively dependent on PI.  A strong positive de- 
pendence of ci on PI  will result in positive total effects of increasing PI  on A, 
and W2. 
The analysis to this point has dealt with a single consumer, who is either an 
owner or a renter. Now consider a population of consumers, identical except 
for heterogeneity in beliefs about expected capital gains; that is, ci has a distri- 
bution over the population. If supplies of  rental and owner housing are fixed, 
then prices adjust to equilibrate demand and supply, with consumers with high 
a becoming owners. The comparative statics of demand are then as follows: 
An  increase in R, and under usual circumstances a decrease in PI  or a shift 
upward in the ct of each consumer, will increase the utility of owning and lead 
at the  margin  to moves from renting  to owning.  If  supplies are completely 
inelastic, this increase in demand for owning will be offset by a combination 
of increasing R and decreasing PI. 
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